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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to compare the similarities and differences between 
Bayesian and belief function reasoning. Our main conclusion is that although 
there are obvious differences in semantics, representations, the rules for 
combining and marginalizing representations, there are many similarities. We 
claim that the two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. Each calculus 
has its own semantics that allow us to construct models suited for these semantics. 
Once we have a model in either calculus, one can transform it to the other by 
means of a suitable transformation. 




Bayesian probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of belief functions are two 
distinct calculi for modeling and reasoning with knowledge about propositions in uncertain 
domains. Bayesian networks and Dempster-Shafer belief networks both provide graphical and 
numerical representations of uncertainty. While these calculi have important differences, their 
underlying structures have many significant similarities. In this paper, we investigate the 
similarities and the differences between the two calculi. 
 A Bayesian network is a probability model consisting of a directed acyclic graph 
representing conditional independence assumptions in the joint distribution [Spiegelhalter et al. 
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1993]. A D-S belief network graphically describes knowledge and the relationships among 
variables using the so-called Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. Numerically, a 
Bayesian network consists of a factorization of a joint probability distribution into a set of 
conditional distributions, one for each variable in the network. A D-S belief network assigns D-S 
belief functions or basic probability assignments (bpa’s) to subsets of the variables in the domain 
of each relation. Likelihood functions can be used to update a Bayesian network, while 
additional evidence entered as bpa’s is used to update the D-S belief network. 
 The graphical representations in each type of network use variables and their respective 
state spaces. The relationships between these variables encode qualitative conditional 
independence assumptions of the uncertain domain. Bayesian and D-S networks model similar 
sets of conditional independence assumptions. 
 Similarities of Bayesian and D-S belief networks and their underlying calculi have been 
noted previously. The theory of belief functions captures Bayesian probability models as a 
special case, so any Bayesian network model can be replicated exactly in a D-S belief network 
model [Zarley et al. 1988]. Similarly, any D-S belief network model can be approximated by a 
corresponding Bayesian network model [Shafer 1986]. 
 Shafer and Srivastava [1990] argue that the belief-function calculus is a generalization of 
the Bayesian probability calculus and show that any Bayesian model of uncertainty is also a 
belief function model. They make a case for using the belief function calculus in the context of 
auditing due to its greater flexibility, but emphasize that using belief functions does not eliminate 
the possibility of later using the advantages of propagation associated with Bayesian reasoning. 
According to their conclusions, belief functions allow non-statistical evidence to be modeled in a 
way that legitimately represents the underlying knowledge base. 
 Our basic thesis is that Bayesian and D-S reasoning have “roughly” the same expressive 
power. We say roughly since we do not have an exact metric to measure the expressiveness of an 
uncertainty calculus. The two calculi have different semantics. However, given a model in one 
calculus, it is possible to transform the model to the other and achieve the same qualitative 
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results. Confirming this thesis will allow these two calculi to be further integrated in decision-
making applications. In a related paper [Cobb and Shenoy 2003], we examine methods for 
transforming a belief function model to an equivalent probability model. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
representation, semantics and process of making inferences in a Bayesian network. In Section 3, 
D-S belief network representations of uncertainty and their semantics are reviewed. Section 4 
compares and contrasts important facets of Bayesian and D-S belief networks. Finally, Section 5 
contains a summary and some conclusions. 
 
2. Bayesian Networks 
 Representation. Bayesian networks model knowledge about propositions in uncertain 
domains using graphical and numerical representations [Spiegelhalter et al. 1993]. At the 
qualitative level, a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent variables 
and the graph represents conditional independence relations among the variables, in a sense to be 
described shortly. At the numerical level, a Bayesian network consists of a factorization of a 
joint probability distribution into a set of conditional distributions, one for each variable in the 
network. Additional knowledge in the form of likelihood functions can be used to update the 
joint probability distribution. 
 Each variable in the network has a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible 
values that comprise its state space. If there is a directed arc from variable X to variable Y, we 
say X is a parent of Y and Y is a child of X. Based on expert knowledge or empirical 
observations, a set of conditional probability distributions is specified for each variable, one for 
each configuration of states of the variable’s parents. 
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 Semantics. Figure 2.1 shows a Bayesian network for a hypothetical anti-air threat 
identification problem. The graph representing probabilistic relationships among the nodes 
reveals the conditional independence relations assumed in the network. Each variable in the 
network has a set of parents. The parents of each node are listed in Table 2.1 for each variable in 
the network of Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1. A Bayesian Network for the Anti-Air Threat Identification Problem 
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
Visibility (V)
Threat Effective? (TE)ML_Indicator (ML) EO_Sensor (EO)




 Consider an ordering of the variables such that the variables at the tail of directed arcs 
precede variables at the heads of the directed arcs. Since the directed graph is acyclic, such an 
ordering always exists. One such ordering in the example network of Figure 2.1 is T R E TM G V 
ML EO RWR TE. Each variable in a Bayesian network is implicitly assumed to be conditionally 
independent of its predecessors in the ordering, given its parents. Table 2.2 summarizes a 
minimal set of conditional independence relations assumed in the Bayesian network of Figure 
2.1. In summary, missing arcs from a variable to its successors in the ordering imply conditional 
independence assumptions in the joint probability distribution represented by the Bayesian 
network. 
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Table 2.1. Network Ordering Relationships for Threat ID Bayesian Network 
Variable Description # States Parents 
T Threat ID 7 {Ø} 
R Range 7 {Ø} 
E Emitter 7 {T} 
TM Threat Mode 7 {T, R} 
G Guidance 2 {T} 
V Visibility 3 {Ø} 
ML Missile Launch Indicator 2 {TM} 
EO Electro-Optical Sensor 3 {TM, G} 
RWR Radar Warning Receiver 2 {TM, G} 
TE Threat Effectiveness 2 {G, V} 
 
Table 2.2. One Set of Conditional Independence Assumptions for the Threat ID Bayes Net 
R ⊥ T 
E ⊥ R | T 
TM ⊥ E | {T, R} 
G ⊥ {R, E, TM} | T 
V ⊥ {T, R, E, TM, G} 
ML ⊥ {T, R, E, G, V} | TM 
EO ⊥ {T, R, E, V, ML} | {TM, G} 
RWR ⊥ {T, R, E, V} | {TM, G} 
TE ⊥ {T, R, E, TM, ML, EO, RWR} | {G, V} 
 
 As an illustration, if the true state of the Threat ID (T) is known, information about the 
true state of Range (R), Threat Mode (TM), or Emitter (E) gives no additional information 
regarding the probability distribution of the Guidance (G) variable; therefore, G is conditionally 
independent of R, E and TM given T. Similarly, Threat Effectiveness (TE) is conditionally 
independent of all variables in the network except its parents: Guidance (G) and Visibility (V). If 
there is more than one sequence of variables that is consistent with the directed arcs, then the set 
of conditional independence relations associated with each sequence can be shown to be 
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equivalent using the properties of conditional independence relations [Dawid 1979, Pearl 1988, 
Lauritzen et al. 1990]. While the lack of an arc between two nodes represents a conditional 
independence assumption, the presence of an arc does not necessarily imply dependence. 
 Conditional probability functions in a Bayesian network can be combined to produce the 
joint distribution of all variables by applying the multiplicative law of probability. The 
calculation of the joint distribution in the Bayesian network of Figure 2.1 can be accomplished as 
follows (where ⊗ denotes pointwise multiplication of functions): 
P(T , R, E,TM ,G,V , ML,EO, RWR,TE) =
P(T )⊗ P(R | T ) ⊗ P(E | T , R)⊗ P(TM | T , R,E) ⊗ P(G | T ,R, E,TM }⊗ P(V | T ,R,E,TM ,G)⊗
P(ML | T , R, E,TM ,G,V )⊗ P(EO | T , R, E,TM ,G,V, ML) ⊗
P(RWR | T , R,E,TM ,G,V ,ML, EO) ⊗ P(TE | T ,R,E,TM ,G,V, ML, RWR)
 
However, by taking advantage of the conditional independence assumptions (listed in Table 2.2), 
the calculation can be reduced to: 
P(T , R, E,TM ,G,V , ML,EO, RWR,TE) =
P(T )⊗ P(R)⊗ P(E | T ) ⊗ P(TM | T , R)⊗ P(G | T ) ⊗ P(V) ⊗ P(ML | TM )⊗
P(EO | TM ,G) ⊗ P(RWR | TM ,G) ⊗ P(TE | G,V )
 
 In order to define combination of probability functions, we first need a notation for the 
projection of states of a set of variables to a smaller set of variables. Here projection simply 
means dropping extra coordinates; if (w, x, y, z) is a state of {W, X, Y, Z}, for example, then the 
projection of (w, x, y, z) to {W, X} is simply (w, x), which is a state of {W, X}. If s and t are sets 
of variables, s ⊆ t, and x is a state of t, then x↓s denotes the projection of x to s. 
 Combination in a Bayesian network involves “pointwise” multiplication of probability 
functions. Suppose Ps is a probability function for s and Pt is a probability function for t. Then 
Ps⊗Pt is a probability function for s ∪ t defined as follows: 




for each x ∈ Ωs∪t, where K =∑{Ps(x
↓s)Pt(x
↓t) | x ∈ Ωs∪t} is a normalization constant. The un-
normalized combination will be denoted by ⊗´, i.e., 
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 (Ps⊗´Pt)(x) = Ps(x
↓s)Pt(x
↓t) (2.2) 
 Marginalization in a Bayesian network involves addition over the state space of the 
variables being eliminated. Suppose Ps is a probability function for s, and suppose A ∈ s. The 
marginal of Ps for s\{A}, denoted by Ps
↓s\{A}, is a probability function for s\{A} defined as 
follows: 
 Ps
↓s\{A}(x) = Σ{Ps(x, a) | a ∈ ΩA} for all x ∈ Ωs\{A}. (2.3) 
Here, the symbol ‘\’ denotes set-theoretic subtraction, i.e., s\r denote the set of all elements of s 
that are not in r. 
 Inference. The conditional probability functions (or conditionals, in short) specified in 
the construction of a Bayesian network can be used to calculate the prior joint distribution of the 
variables in the model. Inference in a Bayesian network involves updating the prior joint 
distribution with observations of actual states of certain variables or likelihoods of occurrence of 
variables based on new information. Once the likelihoods or variables are instantiated into the 
network, combination of probabilities proceeds as pointwise multiplication of likelihoods and 
conditionals. This combination results in an un-normalized posterior joint distribution. The 
process of computing posterior marginal probabilities given observations or likelihoods is 
referred to as evidence propagation. 
 In the example of Figure 2.1, given the number of states in the state space of the 
variables, the joint distribution will have 74 · 24 · 32 = 345,744 states. Determining the marginal 
probability of each variable from the joint distribution is conceptually simple, but 
computationally expensive. Fortunately, methods for calculating the marginal probabilities of 
variables of interest using local computation—without explicitly computing the joint 
distribution—are available [Pearl 1986, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988, Jensen et al. 1990, 
Shenoy and Shafer 1990]. Software is readily available for automating the process of inference 
in Bayesian networks; the examples presented here use Netica [www.norsys.com] to calculate 
the prior and posterior marginal distributions. 
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 The network from Figure 2.1 is shown again in Figure 2.2 with the prior marginal 
probabilities calculated based on the assigned conditional distributions. 
Figure 2.2. Numerical Representation of the Threat ID Bayesian Network 































































































 Suppose the following information becomes available: 
(1) The true state of Threat Effectiveness (TE) = Y. 
(2) Intelligence reports the presence of threats SA-4, SA-6, ZSU-23/4, A3F-23/2 and 
A3F-35/2 with low confidence (3:2 odds)1 






 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 
 
                                                 
1 We have in mind an intelligence source with reliability 1/3 who tells us that the enemy only has threats SA-4, SA-
6, ZSU-23/4, A3F-23/2 and A3F-35/2. Thus, using the language of belief function, we can model this as a basic 
probability assignment: m({SA-4, SA-6, ZSU-23/4, A3F-23/2 and A3F-35/2}) = 1/3, m(ΩT) = 2/3. If we convert 
this bpa to a probability function using the plausibility transformation method [Cobb and Shenoy 2003, see also the 
discussion in Section 4 of this paper], we get the un-normalized function as shown, i.e., if e denotes the evidence, 
then, e.g., P(e|SA-4)/P(e|SA-8) = 3/2, etc. Notice that since Bayesian combination operation defined in (2.1) 
involves normalization, we have the flexibility of expressing a likelihood vector in relative magnitudes. Thus the 
likelihood vector (1, 1, 2/3. 2/3. 1, 1, 1) is equivalent to the likelihood vector (3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3) since the relative 
magnitudes are the same. 
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(3) Visibility is bright but hazy (1:2:0 for Hi:Me:Lo) 
L(V) Hi Me Lo 
 1 2 0 
 
Adding this information as likelihoods in the Bayesian network yields the marginal probabilities 
of the posterior distribution, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3. Bayesian Network after Calculation of the Marginals of the Posterior Distribution 































































































 The posterior distribution provides updated information about the probabilities of each 
state of the Threat (T) variable. Prior to adding the new information to the network, each state of 
T had a probability of occurrence of 1/7. The posterior distribution reveals that the states {SA-8} 
and {SA-9} are slightly less likely than the other five states. 
 The type of inference where marginal probabilities for variables of interest are updated is 
referred to as sum propagation. Another type of inference—max propagation—finds the 
configuration of states of variables that has the maximum probability, i.e., a mode of the joint 
distribution. 
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 Bayesian networks use conditional probability functions as their numerical inputs. 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) belief networks are graphical representations that use D-S belief 
functions or basic probability assignments as their numerical inputs. These are described in the 
next section. 
 
3. Dempster-Shafer Belief Networks 
 Representation. Dempster-Shafer (D-S) belief networks are an alternative to Bayesian 
networks for modeling knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains graphically and 
numerically. At the qualitative level, a D-S belief network provides a graphical description of the 
knowledge base by modeling variables and their relations. At the numerical level, a D-S belief 
network assigns a D-S belief function or bpa to subsets of the variables in the domain of each 
relation. Additional knowledge entered as evidence is used to update the D-S belief network. 
 The valuation network (VN) graph defined by Shenoy [1992] can be used to construct a 
D-S belief network. This is done for the hypothetical anti-air threat identification problem in 
Figure 3.1. The rounded rectangles represent variables and the hexagons represent valuations, 
which are functions representing knowledge about relations between the variables. Each 
valuation is connected by an edge to each variable in its domain to create a bipartite graph. 
Rectangles represent evidence. In Figure 3.1, evidence is available regarding variables R and V. 
The arcs connecting valuations to variables are typically undirected; however if a bpa m for a set 
of variables, say h∪t, is a “conditional” for some, say h, given the rest t, then this is indicated by 
making the edges between m and the variables in h directed. Suppose m is a bpa for h∪t. We say 
m is a conditional for h given t if m↓t is a vacuous bpa, i.e., m↓t(Ωt) = 1. In the D-S network 
shown in Figure 3.1, since this network models the same knowledge as described in the Bayes 
net of Figure 2.1, most of the valuations representing the knowledge of the domain are 
conditionals. Thus, e.g., the bpa mT-E is a conditional for E given T. In the valuation network 
   11
representation in Figure 3.1, we have chosen to omit variable TE and have represented the 
relationship between visibility and guidance directly as bpa mV-G. See Section 4 for more details 
about the bpa mV-G. 
 Semantics. D-S belief networks are constructed with the fundamental assumption that 
combining all bpa’s yields the correct joint bpa. Let mi be a D-S bpa for valuation node i in a  
D-S belief network. Then m = ⊕{mi | i = 1, …, n} is the joint bpa which is obtained by 
combining all bpa’s in a D-S belief network. In the example of Figure 3.1: 
m = m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ mT ⊕ mV  T −TM −R T−E T −G V −G TM −ML G−M −EO TM −G −RWR
Assuming the joint bpa can be determined in this way equates to assuming a set of 
conditional independence relations in the joint bpa [Shenoy 1994]. These conditional 
independence assumptions are encoded in the structure of the valuation network graph, as 
opposed to the numerical details of the bpa’s. Variable X is a neighbor of variable Y if there 
exists a non-vacuous bpa whose domain includes {X, Y}. Suppose r, s, and t are three disjoint 
subsets of variables. Then r and s are conditionally independent given t if every path from a 
variable in r to a variable in s contains a variable in t. For example, consider three disjoint 
subsets of variables in the network of Figure 3.1: r = {T, R, E}, s = {V}, and t = {G}. All paths 
from a node in r to a node in s includes variable G. Therefore, r and s are conditionally 
independent given t. Notice that each variable, given its neighbors, is independent of all 
remaining variables. Table 3.1 all such conditional independence assumptions in the network of 
Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. A Dempster-Shafer Belief Network for the Anti-Air Threat Identification Problem 
Threat Mode (TM) Guidance (G)Emitter (E) Visibility (V)










 The conditional independence condition implicit in a D-S belief network ignores the 
presence of conditional bpa’s. Shenoy [1994b] describes how the presence of conditionals can be 
used to detect additional independence conditions. If one takes into account these additional 
conditions then conditional independence assumptions in the D-S belief network of Figure 3.1 
are exactly the same as those in the Bayesian network of Figure 2.1. 
 D-S belief network models are created using two-part construction. First, the structure of 
the belief network is formed using one of two methods. An expert’s causal knowledge can be 
used to assess conditional independence relations by determining “direct causes”; this method is 
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similar to that used in constructing a Bayesian network. Alternatively, conditional independence 
relations can be directly assessed using the no double-counting interpretation. 
Table 3.1. Conditional Independence Assumptions for the Threat ID D-S Belief Network 
Variable Neighbors Conditional Independence Assumption 
T R, E, TM, G T ⊥ {V, ML, EO, RWR} | {R, E, TM, G} 
TM T, G, R, ML, EO, RWR TM ⊥ {E, V} | {T, G, R, ML, EO, RWR} 
G T, TM, EO, RWR, V G ⊥ {E, R, ML} | {T, TM, EO, RWR, V} 
E T E ⊥ {R, TM, G, V, ML, EO, RWR} | T 
R T, TM R ⊥ {E, G, V, ML, EO, RWR} | {T, TM} 
V G V ⊥ {T, TM, G, R, ML, EO, RWR} | G 
RWR TM, G RWR ⊥ {T, E, R, V, ML, EO} | {TM, G} 
EO TM, G EO ⊥ {T, E, R, V, ML, RWR} | {TM, G} 
ML TM ML ⊥ {T, R, G, V, ML, EO, RWR} | TM 
 
 To illustrate the no double-counting interpretation of conditional independence, consider 
two variables Threat (T) and Emitter (E) in the D-S belief network described previously with the 
joint distribution PT, E. Probability theory defines the factorization of the joint distribution as: 
PT, E = PT⊗PE|T where PT = PT, E
↓Τ and PE|T = PT, E/PT. Thus, it is okay to combine PT and PE|T 
since it will always give the correct joint function PT, E. In the illustration, PT encodes 
information about T, but PE|T encodes nothing about T because PE|T has the property that PE|T
↓T 
is vacuous. Thus, there is no double counting of information about T in the combination of PT 
and PE|T. 
 Suppose now that PT, E is constructed by combining PT with PE. Consider PE that is 
computed from PT, E as follows: PE = PT, E
↓E. In general, PT, E ≠ PT⊗PE. Thus PT and PE are not 
independent with respect to PT, E. Notice that PE = PT, E
↓E = [PT⊗PE|T]
↓E. Since PE contains 
information about T, in combining PT and PE, information about PT is double-counted and 
therefore this product will clearly not yield the correct joint distribution PT, E. There are two 
cases where PT and PE are independent with respect to PT, E. First, if PT = PT⊗PT, then PT, E = 
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PT⊗PE. In this case, although there is double counting of PT, this is of no consequence because 
PT is idempotent. Second, suppose that the values of PE|T don’t depend on T, i.e., PE|T (ei, tj) = 
PE|T (ei, tk) for all ei ∈ ΩE, and all tj, tk ∈ ΩT. In this case, it is easy to show that PE|T (ei, tj) = 
PE(ei) for all tj ∈ ΩT, and consequently, PE = PT, E
↓E = [PT⊗PE|T]
↓E = [PT⊗PE]
↓E. In the process 
of marginalizing PT⊗PE to E, information in PT is completely removed. Therefore PE⊗PT = 
PT, E and there is no double counting. 
The model developed in Figure 3.1 for the hypothetical anti-air threat identification 
problem will be correct if there is no double-counting of uncertain information in the joint bpa: 
m = m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ m ⊕ mT ⊕ mV . T −TM −R T−E T −G V −G TM −ML G−M −EO TM −G −RWR
 Projection and Extension of Subsets. Before we can define combination and 
marginalization for bpa potentials, we need the concepts of projection and extension of subsets 
of a state space. 
 If r and s are sets of variables, r ⊆ s, and a is a nonempty subset of Ωs, then the 
projection of a to r, denoted by a↓r, is the subset of Ωr given by a↓r = {x↓r | x ∈ a}. 
 By extension of a subset of a state space to a subset of a larger state space, we mean a 
cylinder set extension. If r and s are sets of variables, r is a proper subset of s, and a is a 
nonempty subset of Ωr, then the extension of a to s is a×Ωs\r. Let a↑s denote the extension of a to 
s. For example, if a is a nonempty subset of Ω{W, X}, then the extension of a to {W, X, Y, Z} is 
a×Ω{Y, Z}. 
 Dempster’s Rule of Combination. Calculation of the joint bpa in a D-S belief network 
is accomplished by combination using Dempster’s Rule [Dempster 1966]. Consider two bpa’s 
mX and mY for x and y, respectively. The combination of mX and mY, denoted by mX⊕mY, is a bpa 
for x∪y given by 
  (mX⊕mY)(c) = K
–1Σ{mX(a)mY(b) | (a
↑(x∪y))∩(b↑(x∪y)) = c} 
for all nonempty c ⊆ Ωx∪y, where K is a normalization constant given by 
   K = Σ{mX(a)mY(b) | (a
↑(x∪y))∩(b↑(x∪y)) ≠ ∅}. 
The un-normalized joint bpa for x∪y is given by 
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 (mX⊕′mY)(c) = Σ{mX(a)mY(b) | (a
↑(x∪y))∩(b↑(x∪y)) = c} 
for all nonempty c ⊆ Ωx∪y. 
 Clearly, if the normalization constant is equal to zero, the combination is not defined, so 
the two bpa’s are termed not combinable. If the bpa’s mX and mY are based on independent 
bodies of evidence, then mX⊕mY represents the result of pooling these bodies of evidence. Shafer 
[1976] shows that Dempster’s Rule is commutative and associative, so the bpa’s representing the 
evidence in the network of Figure 3.1, for instance, could be combined in any order to yield the 
joint bpa. 
 Marginalization. Like marginalization for probability functions, marginalization for bpa 
is obtained by addition. Suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose A ∈ s. The marginal of m for 
s\{A}, denoted by m↓(s\{A}), is the bpa for s\{A} defined as follows: 
 m↓(s\{A})(a) = Σ{m(b) | b ⊆ Ωs such that b↓(s\{A}) = a} 
for all nonempty subsets a of Ωs\{A}. 
 To illustrate Dempster’s rule, consider mT−E, , one of the valuations in the D-S belief 
network of Figure 3.1. Define the state spaces for the variables Threat (T) and Emitter (E) as 
follows: 
ΩT Description  ΩE Description 
t1 SA-4  e1 Pathhand 
t2 SA-6  e2 Straightflush 
t3 SA-8  e3 Landroll 
t4 SA-9  e4 Gundish 
t5 ZSU-23/4  e5 ZSU-FC 
t6 A3F-23/2  e6 A23-FC 
t7 A3F-35/2  e7 A35-FC 
 
Configurations of the two variables are assigned mass in the bpa mT–E as follows: 
 mT–E({(t1,e1), (t2,e2), (t3,e3), (t4,e3), (t5,e4), (t5,e5), (t6,e6), (t7,e7)}) = 1.00 
Suppose weak evidence exists that the Threat (T) is in the subset, a = {t1, t2, t5, t6, t7}. This 
evidence about the Threat (T) is introduced into the network through another bpa: 
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 mT({t1, t2, t5, t6, t7}) = 0.3, mT(ΩT) = 0.7 
These two bpa’s are combined using Dempster’s Rule resulting in the joint bpa mT-E⊕mΤ 
described as follows: 
 (mT−E ⊕ mT )({(t1, e1 ),(t2 ,e2 ),(t5 ,e4 ),(t5 ,e5 ),(t6 ,e6 ),(t7,e7 )}) = 0.3 
 (mT−E ⊕ mT )({(t1, e1 ),(t2 ,e2 ),(t3,e3),(t4 ,e3 ),(t5,e4 ),(t5 ,e5 ),(t6 ,e6 ),(t7, e7 )}) = 0.7  
The resulting combination can be marginalized to the Threat (T) variable as follows: 
 (mT − E ⊕ mT )
↓T ({t1,t2,t5, t6, t7}) = 0.3, (mT − E ⊕ mT )
↓T (ΩT ) = 0.7. 
A useful way to summarize the information contained in the resulting bpa is to calculate the 
corresponding plausibility function. The plausibility function corresponding to a bpa mT is 
defined as a function Pl: 2Ωs → [0,1] such that: Pl({a}) = Σ{mT(b) | b∩a ≠ ∅}. 
 In this case, it may be useful to focus on the singleton elements of Threat (T) to determine 
which are now considered most likely. Plausibilities are calculated as follows, with the rightmost 
column representing the normalized plausibility calculated by dividing the plausibility of each 
element by the sum of all the plausibilities: 
 
ΩT Description Pl(T) “Normalized” Pl(T) 
t1 SA-4 0.3+0.7 = 1.0 0.15625 
t2 SA-6 0.3+0.7 = 1.0 0.15625 
t3 SA-8 0.7 0.10938 
t4 SA-9 0.7 0.10938 
t5 ZSU-23/4 0.3+0.7 = 1.0 0.15625 
t6 A3F-23/2 0.3+0.7 = 1.0 0.15625 
t7 A3F-35/2 0.3+0.7 = 1.0 0.15625 
 
Based on the combined evidence, the SA-8 and SA-9 states are considered slightly weaker than 
the other potential threats. 
 Bayesian networks and D-S belief networks have been proposed as alternative methods 
of modeling knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains. Both systems are composed of 
   17
both graphical and numerical representations. The next section compares Bayesian networks and 
D-S belief networks and examines the similarities and differences. 
 
4. A Comparison 
The previous two sections have described the representation and semantics of Bayesian networks 
and Dempster-Shafer (D-S) belief networks. Differences between the two types of models exist 
in the graphical representations, numerical details, semantics and methods of performing 
inference. However, the two types of models are also similar in important aspects. 
 The graphical representations in each type of network use variables and assign state 
spaces to each variable. The relationships between these variables encode qualitative conditional 
independence assumptions of the uncertain domain. The differences in the conditional 
independence assumptions in Bayesian and D-S networks are superficial, as most of the 
conditional independence assumptions encoded in a Bayesian network are also represented in the 
corresponding D-S belief network. Those conditional independence assumptions present in the 
Bayesian network that are not encoded in the D-S belief network are a consequence of the 
valuations not being conditional probabilities. These assumptions are not used for propagation by 
general-purpose algorithms for computing marginals. 
 Bayesian network model construction involves assessing conditional independence 
relations by considering “direct causes” and “irrelevance” as criteria, whereas construction of a 
D-S belief network model involves assessing conditional independence relations using semantics 
of “no double-counting.” At the numerical level, a Bayesian network is composed of a 
factorization of a joint probability distribution for the variables in the network that can be used to 
specify prior marginal probabilities for each variable. In a D-S belief network, bpa’s are 
specified for each valuation and can be used to calculate a joint bpa for the variables in the 
network, provided there is no double-counting of evidence. 
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 The differing numerical representations in Bayesian networks and D-S belief networks 
each have relative advantages and weaknesses. Conditional probabilities are easy to use for 
representing causal knowledge, but can be difficult and non-intuitive to use for associational, 
logical, and other types of non-causal knowledge. On the other hand, bpa’s are not intuitive to 
use for capturing causal knowledge, but are much easier to use for capturing evidence. Updating 
of knowledge in Bayesian networks is accomplished by using likelihoods, whereas updating of 
knowledge in D-S belief networks is performed by specifying evidence as bpa’s. 
 As an example of the differences in numerical representation of causal knowledge using 
Bayesian and D-S belief networks, consider a domain with two variables: Cancer (C) and 
Smoking (S). The state space of S is comprised of two propositions: s = a person is a smoker and 
~s = a person is a non-smoker; C is defined similarly for cancer. The knowledge that smoking 
causes cancer can be encoded in conditional probabilities by assigning a higher probability to the 
presence of cancer given that a person smokes and a relatively lower probability to cancer given 
that a person does not smoke. For instance, based on expert knowledge or historical data, a 
conditional probability representation, P, is specified as: 
 P(c | s) = 0.4, P(~c | s) = 0.6, P(c | ~s) = 0.1, P(~c | ~s) = 0.9 
The probability of having cancer given that a person does not smoke is 0.10, but this probability 
increases to 0.40 given that a person smokes. 
 Smets [1978] (see also [Shafer 1982, Smets 1993a]) defines an operation, called the 
ballooning extension, for creating a bpa from a conditional probability representation for models 
consisting of a finite number of conditions, each based on independent empirical data. Using the 
above conditional representation P, the following bpa assignments are created: 
 m1({(c, s), (c, ~s), (~c, ~s)}) = 0.4 m2({(c, ~s), (c, s), (~c, s)}) = 0.1 
 m1({(~c, s), (c, ~s), (~c, ~s)}) = 0.6 m2({(~c, ~s), (c, s), (~c, s)}) = 0.9 
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 In this example, let Θ ={s, ~s} denote the set of possible values for the parameter, θ, X = 
{c, ~c} represent the set of outcomes and Pθ: θ ∈ Θ denote the probability model. The 
corresponding bpa, m, is constructed by combining m1 and m2 using Dempster’s Rule as follows: 
 
m({(c,s),(c,~ s )})= (0.4) ⋅(0.1) = 0.04
m({(c,s),(~ c,~ s )}) = (0.4) ⋅(0.9) = 0.36
m({(~ c,s),(c,~ s )}) = (0.6) ⋅(0.1) = 0.06
m({(~ c,s),(~ c,~ s )}) = (0.6) ⋅(0.9) = 0.54
 
The bpa, m, has the following properties: 
(1) m↓s is vacuous. 
(2) If ms(s) = 1, then (m ⊕ ms )
↓c(c) = 0.4, ((m⊕ ms )
↓c(~ c) = 0.6  
(3) If m~s(~s) = 1, then (m ⊕ m~s )
↓c(c) = 0.1, ((m ⊕ m~ s )
↓c (~ c) = 0.9 
The ballooning extension representation of conditional probability distribution described 
above is only one method of several others that also satisfy the three conditions stated above. 
Other methods for constructing belief functions from conditional probability distributions have 
been described by Black and Laskey [1990], Dubois and Prade [1986], and Srivastava [1997]. 
 To illustrate the representation of non-causal knowledge using both Bayesian and D-S 
numerical representations, consider the example of visibility (V) and guidance (G) of anti-air 
threats from the anti-air threat identification problem. A conditional representation requires 
creating a dummy variable (TE) whose parents are V and G, then instantiating TE = y, and 
expressing the constraint between V and G in P(TE = y | V, G). The conditional representation for 
each combination of states of V and G is defined in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Conditional Representation for each Combination of States of V and G 
P(TE|V, G) y n 
Hi, R 1 0 
Hi, EO 1 0 
Me, R 1 0 
Me, EO 0.4 0.6 
Lo, R 1 0 
Lo, EO 0.1 0.9 
 
A bpa for the valuation V-G in the D-S belief network is as follows: 
 
mV −G ({(Hi, R),(Hi, EO),(Me, R),(Lo, R)}) = 0.6
mV −G ({(Hi, R),(Hi, EO),(Me, R),(Me,EO),(Lo, R)}) = 0.3
mV −G ({(Hi, R),(Hi, EO),(Me, R),(Me,EO),(Lo, R),(Lo, EO)}) = 0.1
 
To understand this bpa, suppose V = Hi is represented as mV = Hi({Hi}) = 1. Then (mV–
G⊕mV=Hi)
↓G is as follows: (mV–G⊕mV=Hi)
↓G({R, EO}) = 1. Similarly, if V = Me, then (mV–
G⊕mV=Me)
↓G({R}) = 0.6, (mV–G⊕mV=Me)
↓G({R, EO}) = 0.4. And if V = Lo, then (mV–
G⊕mV=Lo)
↓G({R}) = 0.9, (mV–G⊕mV=Lo)
↓G({R, EO}) = 0.1. Thus, mV–G can be thought of as a 
“conditional” for G yielding the above bpa’s for different observed values of V. 
 Belief functions are easier to use for modeling evidence than likelihoods. For example, in 
the anti-air threat identification problem, if weak evidence (reliability = 1/3) is available that the 
enemy has only SA-4, SA-6, ZSU-23/4, A3F-23/2 and A3F-35/2 threats, this evidence can be 
easily modeled with the following bpa: 
  m({SA–4, SA–6, ZSU–23/4, A3F–23/2, A3F–35/2}) = 1/3   
  m(ΩT) = 2/3  
 To model this evidence as a likelihood function, we assign a likelihood for each state that 
is proportional to the plausibility of that state: 
 
L(SA − 4) = L(SA − 6) = L (ZSU − 23 / 4) = L(A3F − 23 / 2) = L(A3F − 35 / 2) = 1
L(SA − 8) = L (SA − 9) = 2 / 3  
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These likelihoods can then be entered into the Bayesian network in the usual inference process. 
The likelihoods should be based on evidence alone so that there is no double counting of 
knowledge already represented in the Bayesian network. 
 We conclude this section by discussing an example used by Bogler [1987] to claim that 
belief functions are superior to probability theory. However, we show that if the belief function 
model is transformed to a probability model correctly (by using the so-called plausibility 
transformation [Cobb and Shenoy 2003], then the two calculi give identical conclusions. 
Bogler’s Example. Consider a Dempster-Shafer model of two independent pieces of 
evidence in the context of the anti-air threat identification problem: 
1. Weak evidence, i.e., reliability is only 0.3, that the threat is a SA-4 missile modeled using 
bpa m1: 
m1({SA − 4}) = 0.3
m1({SA − 4,SA − 6, SA − 8,SA − 9,ZSU − 23/ 4, A3F − 23/ 2,A3F − 35 / 2}) = 0.7
 
2. Evidence that the missile is definitely a SAM modeled using bpa m2: 
m2 ({SA − 4, SA − 6,SA − 8,SA − 9}) =1 
Using Dempster’s rule, the evidence is combined into bpa m1⊕m2: 
 
(m1 ⊕ m2 )({SA − 4}) = 0.3
(m1 ⊕ m2 )({SA − 4,SA − 6,SA − 8,SA − 9}) = 0.7
 
The plausibilities of each singleton subsets in the combined bpa are: 
 
Plm1⊕m2 ({SA − 4}) =1
Plm1⊕m2 ({SA − 6}) = 0.7
Plm1⊕m2 ({SA − 8}) = 0.7
Plm1⊕m2 ({SA − 9}) = 0.7
 
The ratio of the plausibilities of states {SA-4} and {SA-6} are: 
 
Plm1⊕m2 ({SA − 4})





   22
 Suppose a Bayesian probability model has an equally likely prior probability distribution, 
P, for the seven states of the Threat ID (T) variable: 
P({SA − 4}) = P({SA − 6}) = P({SA − 8}) = P({SA − 9}) = P({SZSU − 23/ 4}) = P({A3F − 23/ 2})




The weak evidence that the threat is an SA-4 missile is converted from the bpa representation to 
an un-normalized probability function using the plausibility transformation method [Cobb and 
Shenoy 2003], which yields the un-normalized probability function as follows: 
  
L1({SA − 4}) =1
L1({SA − 6}) = L1({SA − 8}) =L1({SA − 9}) = L1({ZSU − 23/ 4}) = L1({A3F − 23/ 2}) =
L1({A3F − 35 / 2}) = 0.7
The evidence that the missile is definitely a SAM is modeled using a second likelihood function: 
 
L1({SA − 4}) = L1({SA − 6}) = L1({SA − 8}) =L1({SA − 9}) =1
L1({ZSU − 23/ 4}) = L1({A3F − 23/ 2}) = L1({A3F − 35 / 2}) = 0
 
The prior probability distribution, P, and the two likelihood functions, L1 and L2, can then be 
combined and normalized to create a posterior probability distribution, P': 
 P'({SA − 4}) = 0.323, P'({SA − 6}) = P'({SA − 8}) = P'({SA − 9}) = 0.226  








which is roughly the same conclusion as in the belief function model. ■  
 Computationally, D-S belief networks are more expensive to evaluate than Bayesian 
networks. The worst-case complexity of a Bayesian network solution is O(n), where n is the size 
of the state space of the largest clique in the join tree, whereas the worst-case complexity of a  
D-S belief network is O(2n), with n defined equivalently. The size of the state space of the largest 
clique depends on the sizes of the state spaces of variables, the sizes of state spaces of valuations, 
and the structure of the graph. 
 Differences exist in the graphical and numerical representations of Bayesian and D-S 
belief networks; however, as the above examples show, these two frameworks can both be 
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utilized to model knowledge and evidence of varying types. Bayesian networks and D-S belief 
networks both allow representation of knowledge in uncertain domains. Bayesian networks are 
easier to construct in domains where knowledge is causal, whereas D-S belief networks better 
facilitate representation of non-causal knowledge. When multiple models constructed on the 
same domain are available—a combination of Bayesian models and D-S models—a framework 
for combining the knowledge that does not require experts to reassess one model or another 
using a different numerical or graphical representation is needed. Additionally, when knowledge 
is non-causal, building a D-S belief network and solving the network by translating it to a 
corresponding Bayesian network may be a computationally less expensive than solving the D-S 
belief network directly. 
 Consider the Bayesian network of Figure 2.3. For the variables Range (R) and Visibility 
(V), each possible state is considered equally likely in the original problem formulation. 
Additional information about V or R might be more easily modeled as a bpa, as opposed to a 
likelihood function. A device may be designed to provide evidence about range or visibility 
using a bpa; however, since other valuations have been established as conditional probabilities 
and since Bayesian networks are typically more efficient to solve than D-S belief networks, the 
bpa could be transformed to a likelihood function prior to solution of the Bayesian network. 
 The previous example which utilized D-S plausibilities to create an equivalent treatment 
of evidence in D-S and Bayesian models points to a possible solution for combining evidence 
from the two types of models and translating D-S belief networks to Bayesian networks for 
solution during implementation. 
 Proponents of the Dempster-Shafer’s theory of belief functions claim that the D-S theory 
is more expressive than probability theory since it can distinguish between vacuous knowledge 
(represented by a vacuous belief function) and knowledge that all states of a variable are equally 
likely (represented by a Bayesian belief function in which all focal elements are singleton subsets 
with the same probability mass). When such belief functions are converted to equivalent 
probability functions, they both reduce to an equally likely probability distribution. From a 
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descriptive point of view, Ellsberg [1961] argues that human decision makers react quite 
differently to the two different situations. From a normative point of view (e.g. Savage [1950]), 
the two situations have no significant differences for making decisions. We note, however, that 
there is no coherent decision theory for the Dempster-Shafer’s theory that can take advantage of 
this expressiveness. The decision theory proposed by Jaffray [1989] and Strat [1990] requires the 
choice of an ad-hoc parameter that in essence reduces an expectation with respect to a belief 
function to an expectation with respect to a probability function. The decision theory proposed 
by Kennes and Smets [1994] reduces a belief function to a probability function prior to making 
decisions using Bayesian decision theory. Neither decision theory is able to exploit the so-called 
expressiveness of belief functions in representing ignorance. 
 
5. Conclusions and Summary 
The main goal of this paper is to compare two seemingly disparate calculi for uncertain 
reasoning. While there are many differences, there are also many commonalities. Our main 
conclusion is that the two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. The reason we need 
these calculi is that they have different semantics and if our knowledge of the domain fits a 
particular semantic, then we should use the appropriate calculus to build a model in that domain. 
This does not mean that other calculi cannot represent the knowledge in the domain. An analogy 
is having a toolbox with many tools. If one has a nail, use a hammer. If one has a screw, use a 
screwdriver. We can drive a screw with a hammer, but the results may not be so elegant. We are 
skeptical of claims such as one tool is sufficient for all jobs or that one tool is superior to another. 
Thus, e.g., we should not be restricted to using just one calculus. We should be more concerned 
with the models we build using these calculi. The theory of belief functions provides us with 
some semantics for building models. If these semantics are appropriate for the domain we are 
trying to model, we should model the domain using belief functions. 
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The thesis that the theories of belief functions and probability have roughly the same 
expressive power suggests that one can translate a belief function model to an equivalent 
probability model. This topic is explored in detail in Cobb and Shenoy [2003]. 
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